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Comparing Projections and Outcomes 
of IMF-Supported Programs 
ALBERTO MUSSO and STEVEN PHILLIPS*
“Program numbers” from a sample of IMF-supported programs are studied as if
they were forecasts, through statistical analyses of the relationship between
projections and outcomes for growth, inflation, and three balance of payments
concepts. Statistical bias is found only for projections of inflation and official
reserves. Statistical efficiency can be rejected for all variables except growth,
suggesting that some program projections were less accurate than they might have
been. Nevertheless, most projections are found to have some predictive value.
Since several findings are shown to be sample dependent, the full-sample results
should be interpreted cautiously. [JEL C5, E3, D8]
A
ssociated with every economic program supported by IMF resources is a set
of projections, a quantitative framework setting out a particular scenario of
outcomes for policy and other variables. Such a scenario should provide a basis
for determining a coherent set of economic policies and financing plans.
Moreover, program projections for key macro variables are made public, so they
have the potential to convey information useful for private sector decisionmaking.
In light of these functions of program projections, it is natural to ask how they tend
to compare to actual outcomes.
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excellent research assistance.This question became more prominent following 1997, when the IMF
approved financial arrangements with Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, in support
of economic programs calling for continued growth in the near term. In the event,
GDP contracted sharply in all three countries. Moreover, in Korea and Thailand,
program projections for continued current account deficits were instead followed
by large surpluses and capital flight. These large divergences between projections
and outcomes drew critical comments, including some from within the IMF, albeit
with varying interpretations. Some have suggested that the large “forecast errors”
reflected a misunderstanding of these East Asian economies and the crisis they
faced, while others have speculated that the program projections announced by the
IMF may contain a deliberate optimistic bias. 
Lacking from this discussion, however, has been reference to systematic,
statistical evidence about differences between projections and outcomes in IMF-
supported programs in general. Was the recent experience in East Asia atypical, or
in line with a persistent pattern? More generally, do there exist patterns in the
record of program projection errors, the knowledge of which might be used to
improve program projections in the future?
This paper focuses on program projections in three key areas: output growth,
inflation, and the balance of payments. We look for systematic patterns in these
projections’errors—in the traditional terminology of forecast evaluation, for signs
of bias and inefficiency. Where systematic errors seem to exist, we also investigate
whether these could be attributable to systematic differences between programs’
policy assumptions and policies actually implemented. On the accuracy of
program projections (that is, apart from questions of bias or inefficiency), we
make the traditional comparison to a naïve forecast, and we also conduct a test of
directional accuracy.
The limited scope of this study deserves emphasis. Most importantly, this
paper is not a general evaluation of IMF-supported programs, nor by itself can it
be a basis for drawing broad policy lessons about the effectiveness, or value, of
such programs. Certainly, the accuracy or inaccuracy of program projections does
not summarize programs’ success or failure.1 Indeed, beyond presenting the
results of a set of standard statistical exercises, the paper refrains from judgments
about the causal interpretation or normative evaluation of these results. The reason
for this reticence is that it is not clear that IMF “program numbers” are intended
to be, or should aim to be, simple unconditional forecasts. As discussed in Section
II, a variety of strategies for making projections and economic settings could
generate patterns in projection errors, and the empirical analysis here cannot, in
general, differentiate between these possibilities. Despite these limitations, the
statistical facts documented here may be of interest and, ultimately, of practical
use, by suggesting ways to increase the accuracy of projections and by hinting at
areas for future research in broader studies of Fund-supported programs. 
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1For example, if a program’s positive effect on output exceeded projections, this would hardly imply
that the program was a failure. Alternatively, a program with outcomes that matched announced projec-
tions might still be considered a failure if one believes that another policy approach would have resulted
in a superior outcome.This paper may be distinguished in several ways from two related types of
empirical studies. First, a number of studies have systematically analyzed differ-
ences between certain IMF projections and actual results, but none has focused on
the projections made in the context of IMF-supported programs. Rather, these
studies have looked at the projections routinely made—for all IMF member coun-
tries—for the twice-annual World Economic Outlook (for instance,Artis, 1988 and
1997; Barrionuevo, 1993; Artis and Marcellino, 2001; and Beach, Schavey, and
Isidro, 1999). Projections for countries with programs are not analyzed separately;
in fact, the analysis refers to regional aggregations of countries. 
Second, other empirical analyses of Fund-supported programs have empha-
sized broader questions of the general experience under, or the estimated effect of,
IMF-supported programs.2 Some of this literature has used before/after compar-
isons, while another strand has sought to estimate the effect of Fund programs by
constructing a counterfactual no-Fund scenario; neither approach deals with
program projections. Several studies prepared by IMF staff have included select
information on program projections as well as outcomes, but none has concen-
trated on the purely statistical questions of unbiasedness, efficiency, or accuracy.3 
Despite the emphasis here on statistical testing, the presentation of this paper
is intended to be largely accessible to a non-technical audience. Forecast evalua-
tion methods tend to be based on intuitive ideas, and the associated statistical tech-
niques are mostly straightforward. 
I. Interpretational Issues
This first part of this section reviews very basic issues of forecast evaluation;
readers familiar with the subject may be more interested by the second part, which
discusses some important interpretational issues that arise in the particular case of
IMF program projections.
What Makes a Good Forecasting Record?
The question of what makes a good forecasting record has no simple, unique
answer, and forecasts may be analyzed along three dimensions:
• Bias—Do forecasts tend to lean one way or the other, so that errors in one direc-
tion are larger, and/or more numerous, than errors in the opposite direction?
•E fficiency—Do forecasts take all available information into account? If so, there
should be no way to predict the direction or size of projection errors based on
available information (no correlation between any variable measured when the
projections are formed and the error later observed).
•A ccuracy—Do forecasts tend to be near, by some standard, actual outcomes?
And do they tend to correctly predict the direction of change?
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2A summary of this literature can be found in Khan (1990). 
3To  our knowledge, the only analysis with such a focus applied to program projections is a short
unpublished note by Ghosh (1996), which referred mainly to transition economies.This paper asks all three questions,4 since none alone tells the whole story—
each has its own usefulness, as well as its problems of interpretation and other
limitations:
•T ests of bias are simple, intuitive, and decisive; findings of bias have the potential
to be useful in improving forecast accuracy. However, the value of unbiasedness
is not always clear: statistical bias is not necessarily a bad thing, and there may be
good reasons to produce biased forecasts, as discussed below.5 Moreover, fore-
casts that are unbiased could nevertheless suffer from inefficiency, or they could
be so inaccurate as to convey no information at all about future outcomes.
• Results of efficiency tests can also suggest ways to improve forecast accuracy.
Efficiency is a more demanding criterion than unbiasedness; in fact, unbiased-
ness is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for efficiency.6 But, like unbi-
asedness, efficiency does not guarantee that forecasts will be accurate enough to
be useful. Moreover, there is no fully decisive test of efficiency (since failure to
detect inefficiency might reflect an inadequate search for neglected information). 
• In many contexts, accuracy may be what matters most; moreover, it may be
the only thing left to worry about, once steps to eliminate bias and identified
inefficiencies have been taken. But accuracy is a matter of degree, and there is
no objective standard of what is good or bad, or good enough. Accuracy can
only be judged relatively, by comparison to some alternative forecasting
method. Moreover, measurements of accuracy do not offer guidance on how
to improve projections.
Here we will refrain from general judgments of whether IMF program projec-
tions are good or bad. The main point is to document facts—such as patterns or
the absence of patterns—regarding program projection errors.
Interpretational Issues Specific to IMF Program Projections
Several problems and ambiguities with using conventional statistical techniques to
evaluate IMF program projections should be recognized. 
First, and most fundamentally, it is not clear that IMF program projections are
intended to be forecasts, in the usual sense of being unconditional expectations.
Indeed, the term “forecast” seems to be sedulously avoided in IMF public state-
ments about programs, in favor of terms such as “program objective” or “projec-
tion.” In our experience, private discussions among IMF staff follow this pattern
as well, using also such terms as “the baseline scenario” or simply “the program
numbers.” (Note that this paper uses “projections.”)
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4Note that in our terminology, “accuracy” refers only to the size or direction of projection errors;
whereas the statistical literature uses the term more broadly, to also encompass the concepts of unbiased-
ness and efficiency. See for example Diebold and Lopez (1996).
5The statistical terms bias and unbiasedness used here do not have any direct normative content.
Crudely put, it is not necessarily true that a “good” or “honest” forecaster is one who produces unbiased
and efficient forecasts. For example, if the costs of errors in one direction are greater than in the other, a
competent forecaster might intentionally generate numbers biased in the latter direction. 
6Intuitively, a biased forecast is also inefficient because it fails to take into account information on its
own track record of off-centered forecasts.Why might program projections be something other than forecasts? To illustrate
the possibilities, it is useful to consider a number of projection strategies that might
give rise to statistical bias,in the sense of projection errors with a mean other than zero:
An incentive for bias? 
This possibility could work in either direction. A recent publication of the Heritage
Foundation (Beach, Schavey, and Isidro, 1999) hypothesizes that IMF staff may
have an incentive to deliberately err on the side of optimism when projecting the
outcomes of programs supported by IMF financial resources. On the other hand,
since developments under all such programs are reviewed by the IMF’s Executive
Board, one might speculate alternatively that IMF staff would have an incentive to
suggest too-pessimistic projections, preferring that their job later will be one of
explaining results that are “unexpectedly” good rather than bad. 
Projections as conditional on assumptions about future policies?
Program projections should perhaps be thought of as conditional expectations,
representing only the expected outcome in the event that economic policies in the
program country are implemented exactly as negotiated and assumed in the elab-
oration of the program scenario. For example, outcomes for inflation might
systematically deviate from program projections if implementation of monetary or
fiscal policy were to systematically deviate in a particular direction from program
assumptions (and the IMF did not take this pattern into account). 
Asymmetric or bimodal distributions of program outcomes? 
To produce an unbiased forecast, one must construct (at least notionally) a proba-
bility distribution of possible outcomes, then place the forecast at the mean,
“expected” value. However, if this distribution is not symmetric and/or has more
than one mode, the mean will in general differ from the most likely (modal) value,
and from the median value as well. In such situations, it is not obvious that a fore-
caster should aim at the mean. Where the forecast is placed depends on the so-
called loss function; that is, on how the cost of being wrong depends on the
direction and size of the projection error. 
Why might the distribution of program outcomes not be symmetric and
unimodal? Asymmetric exogenous shocks are one possibility; for example, a tropical
country’s output might be subject to occasional but severe hurricane damage, but there
may exist no source of a positive shock capable of affecting output as strongly in the
opposite direction. Another source of asymmetry may be nonlinear responses to
shocks: suppose that the amount of rainfall is normally distributed, but agricultural
output can suffer not only from drought but also from unusually heavy rains. Bimodal
distributions of outcomes may relate to so-called multiple equilibria. For example, a
bimodal distribution of GDP outcomes might be perceived in the early stages of a
balance of payments crisis driven by capital flight; from such a juncture, private sector
confidence will either be quickly restored or it will not, so that either almost none or
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will crash. If the single program scenario tended to refer to a certain one of these two
most likely outcomes, this projection would not likely coincide with the mean. 
Projections aiming to influence program outcomes?
The IMF could believe that announcements of program projections themselves (that
is, beyond effects of announcements of program policies) can influence private
sector expectations and therefore program outcomes. A temptation could then arise
to err deliberately on the side of optimism in announcing program numbers. (For
such a strategy to be effective, markets must believe the IMF to possess superior
information and/or analysis, making its projections more informative than those of
others. Moreover, the resulting pattern of too-optimistic projections must go unde-
tected: otherwise, credibility and therefore influence would in time be lost.)
“Agreed” program numbers as compromises?
If program numbers are the outcome of a negotiation, it is possible that they may not
represent exactly the IMF’s own view but rather a compromise with the authorities’
views or interests. Indeed, while it would be implausible to suppose that the Fund
and its negotiating counterparts would always find themselves in exact agreement on
a program’s likely outcome, the practice is to announce only one set of program
projections—suggesting that at least one of the two negotiating parties has agreed to
a scenario some distance from its own expectations. If one of the parties tends to
generate biased projections, compromise projections will likely also be biased.
As these examples illustrate, it is not obvious that IMF program projections
should be expected to reflect unconditional expectations and therefore to be statisti-
cally unbiased. The more general message is that care needs to be taken in interpreting
the results of applying standard forecast analysis procedures to program projections. 
Indeed, a complete interpretation of the results would require more informa-
tion than can be provided in this study. For example, on the question of bias, note
that the possible origins of bias discussed above are not mutually exclusive—
several could be at work at once. In general, this paper does not attempt to distin-
guish empirically which channel(s) are at work, though it may provide some clues,
along the following lines:
• Conditioning on policy outturns. Where systematic deviations from program
projections are found, we investigate whether such patterns could be attributed to
systematic deviations of economic policies from programs’assumptions.
• Checking for signs of aiming for the mode (or median) in a setting of asymmetric
outcomes. We look for patterns in which the mean error deviates substantially
from zero, the distribution is skewed in that same direction, and the median error
is much smaller in absolute value (or is close to zero).
• Checking whether bias is limited to, or stronger in, programs in which the possi-
bility of multiple equilibria might be especially relevant and/or boosting private
sector confidence might be especially useful. In particular, in Section VIII, the
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capital flight was likely to have been a primary concern. 
The other main interpretational problem is that conventional methods of fore-
cast assessment are best suited to analyzing a track record generated by the
repeated application of a single forecasting procedure to a single, unchanging
economic structure or entity. However, IMF program projections are not generated
by a single forecasting team, let alone a single forecasting model.7 Moreover, the
pooled cross-section sample of projections analyzed here refers to economies of
widely varying structures, and indeed ones especially likely to be changing. Thus
it may not be reasonable to think of the projection errors studied here as being
drawn from a single distribution. One implication is that the pooled errors may not
be normally distributed (even if each itself were drawn from a normal distribu-
tion); indeed, projection errors for only one of the five variables studied appear
normal. Another implication is that the interpretation of the results is more compli-
cated, and in particular it becomes less clear that any findings of bias or other inef-
ficiency can be used to improve the accuracy of future forecasts. 
We  will try to counter these problems in several ways. Thus, we will test
normality rather than only assume it, and we will use several statistical procedures
that do not require normality. We will also be alert to heteroskedasticity. Finally,
we will consider results from distinct subsamples, where we suspect that different
economic/program structures, or changing structures, could be involved.
II. Data and Sample Specification
Data
The list of program projections that could be analyzed is extensive: IMF-supported
programs are typically elaborated in considerable quantitative detail, with the
program scenario including projected values of several hundred variables. Of
these, values for perhaps two dozen “Selected Economic Indicators” might be
announced at a program’s outset.8
Here, we analyze projections for five variables:
• Output growth: projections for percentage change in real GDP 
• Inflation: projections for CPI inflation rates (end-period basis, where available)
• Three balance of payments concepts: the current account balance, net capital
account inflows, and the change in official reserves. 
These variables are selected for their obvious importance and because both
projection and outcome data for them tend to available, both across programs and
also in the sense of being public information, in most cases.9
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7For an informal discussion of how, and in what context, such projections are made, see Mussa and
Savastano (1999).
8See the IMF’s web site for examples of press releases announcing new arrangements.
9Strictly speaking, however, the data analyzed here are those available to IMF staff, and data for
outcomes could in some cases differ from data from other sources. As regards program projections, it is
possible that some of the data used here have never been made public; in order to respect any under-
standings of confidentiality, we will not identify here data specific to any one program.We  also use a set of conditioning variables, to define subsamples and in
regression-based tests of the projections’ efficiency; these variables are discussed
in Sections V and VI.
One of the five projection variables studied, the change in official reserves, has
several unique aspects to be kept in mind. First, official reserves are potentially
subject to direct policy control. Second, decisions of the IMF itself can also influ-
ence reserves outcomes, since its financial support to a program country can deviate
from that envisaged at the program’s outset. Third, this is the only variable studied
for which a “performance criterion” is routinely established in IMF-supported
programs.10 That is, nearly universally, a floor is negotiated at a program’s outset, to
be compared with subsequent outcomes as part of the program’s conditionality for
continued financial support. Such a floor may coincide with the level of reserves
projected in the program scenario, or it may lie somewhat below this. 
Even in this small set of variables, a number of complications arise. As regards
inflation, the CPI is preferred over the GDP deflator, since it is often available on
an end-year (point-to-point) basis. So-called period average CPI inflation must be
used in some cases, however. Also, for some programs, data limitations mean that
the current account balance must be defined excluding receipts of official grants.
Finally, since program projections for capital account flows are specified with
widely varying formats, these had to be measured residually. The upshot is that not
all the data are strictly comparable across countries or programs. However, care
was taken to ensure comparability, within each program, between the definitions
of projections and outcomes.
The precise construction of the projection errors is as follows: for GDP, actual
annual growth rate of real GDP minus projected growth rate (both in percentage
points); for inflation, actual annual percentage change of CPI divided by the
projected change;11 for the three balance of payments measures, actual less
projected flows, in US$, then scaled by actual GDP. For this scaling, a PPP-
adjusted GDP measure is used.12
Sample
The samples analyzed are subsets of the programs approved by the IMF’s
Executive Board during the five-year period from January 1993 through December
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10More precisely, the performance criterion is usually defined in terms of reserves net of liabilities to
the IMF (thus flows from the IMF do not affect measured performance).
11This means, for example, that an inflation outcome of 15 percent when 10 percent had been
projected is considered a much larger error than an outcome of 105 percent for a projection of 100 percent.
The alternative of treating these errors as identical does not seem reasonable, given the well-known corre-
lation between the level of inflation and inflation variability, and it would have induced severe
heteroskedasticity. See also Ghosh and Phillips (1998), who find that the negative empirical association
between inflation and growth rates is nonlinear, such that increments in inflation are of less interest where
inflation is already high.
12For most countries in this sample, PPP-based GDP is three to four times larger than GDP using
actual exchange rates. The latter is problematic since in a certain minority of programs such exchange
rates seem to have been extremely over- or undervalued. Using PPP-based GDP avoids heteroskedasticity
from this source. 1997. Choice of this period is motivated by the desire to capture modern IMF prac-
tices inside a sample of decent size, and with final (or at least reasonably-settled)
data available for program outcomes. 
Data were collected for 69 programs, involving 47 countries, supported by
standby or extended arrangements (“SBAs” or “EFFs”) with the IMF. Excluded
from this set are 22 so-called precautionary stand-by arrangements,13 as well as all
arrangements approved under the IMF’s structural adjustment facilities (“SAF” or
“ESAF” programs).14
A more difficult question is whether programs in transition economies belong
in the analysis. The study period 1993–97 was novel for the IMF in that many of
the programs involved such countries (34 of the 69 programs noted above). For
several reasons, it is difficult to imagine projection errors in these cases, particu-
larly the earlier ones, as being drawn from the same distribution as for other coun-
tries.15 On the other hand, excluding all transition cases would reduce the sample
to only 35. As a compromise approach, we consider as our “basic sample” the set
of 35 non-transition cases plus the 19 transition economy cases approved after
January 1, 1995, a total of 54 programs. However, results are also reported for a
“narrow sample” including only the 35 non-transition cases, and for an “extended
sample” that includes also 15 “early transition” cases (approved in 1993 or 1994),
for a total of 69 programs.
In specifying the exact data to be analyzed, various issues involving timing
arise. First, program projections are frequently revised, sometimes as often as
quarterly, so that there are usually multiple vintages of projections for the same
time period. We choose to examine only original program numbers, meaning the
projections established at the outset, when an arrangement is first approved by the
IMF’s Executive Board. Second, numbers for program outturns may also be
revised over time; we choose to use latest-available numbers, supposing these to
contain less measurement error. Third, we use only annual data, since quarterly
data, especially for projections, are often not available. Fourth, although some
programs do specify projections more than one year ahead, we analyze projections
and outcomes for the “first program year” only. 
A further complication arises in defining the program year: rather than a 12-
month ahead basis, program projections are always defined on either a calendar-
or fiscal-year basis. This means that projections for the “first program year” will
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13These are arrangements approved with the expectation that the program country most likely would
not choose to draw on the resources made available during the arrangement. Our suspicion is that such
arrangements tend to occur in less turbulent times than more typical programs, so that errors in their
projections may be thought of as coming from a different distribution.
14SAF/ESAF-supported programs are excluded because these programs may be of a qualitatively
different nature than SBA/EFF cases, and because they occur in low-income economies that may be struc-
turally different (and may tend to have less accurate data).
15Clearly, these cases represented a novel economic structure and a highly uncertain environment in
general, with such abrupt shocks as economy-wide price liberalization, introduction of new currencies,
and the ending of central planning and directed trade. Moreover, many of these programs involved
economies that in the recent past had not existed as distinct economic entities, and therefore meant
projecting variables for which there were no past data, and which were then being measured for the first
time, often with highly uncertain methods. normally be established sometime within that same year. Consider an example in
which a 12-month SBA is approved in mid-May 1996 (typically, the projections
would have been set a month or so before the approval date): with all data on a
calendar-year basis, we define the first program year as calendar 199616 and record
the projections’ horizon length at approximately seven months. Any arrangement
approved during the first nine months of the year would be treated analogously.
However, for arrangements approved in the last three months of 1996, the first
program year would be defined as 1997. In this way we avoid considering projec-
tions for absurdly short horizon lengths. Still, horizon length varies considerably
across the sample, from a minimum of three to a maximum of 15 months, and this
should be kept in mind, for at least two reasons. First, this variation is a potential
source of heteroskedasticity. Second, when the horizon length is less than 12
months, the program projections in principle have the advantage of being
informed by developments already observed. 
III. Empirical Methods
The statistical procedures used here are fairly straightforward, for the most part
being standard approaches to forecast evaluation, along the dimensions of unbi-
asedness, efficiency, and accuracy.17 Thus, we conduct the usual test of unbiased-
ness, regressing projection errors on a constant in order to estimate the mean error
and testing the hypothesis that this is zero. To test efficiency, we regress outcomes
against projections; we also regress projection errors against a set of variables
containing other information available in the pre-program year. Finally, to provide
a general indication of the accuracy and predictive value of program projections,
we use Theil’s U statistic to compare their track record with that of an alternative
projection, and we also perform tests of directional accuracy (these procedures are
elaborated in Section VIII).18
While such procedures are standard, we would emphasize the following
aspects of the empirical analysis:
•R ather than simply assuming a symmetric, normal distribution, we measure
skewness and test the hypothesis of normality, using the Jarque-Bera test. 
•W e distinguish “median-unbiasedness” from the more standard (mean-) unbi-
asedness. We test the hypothesis that the median error is zero; given the nature of
the data, we use the Wilcoxon signed rank test. This test does not require that the
data be drawn from a normal distribution.
•W e take into account variation in projections’horizon length, in several ways. 
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16At this arrangement’s outset, projections for calendar 1997 might not yet have been set. 
17See for example Diebold and Lopez (1996) and Diebold (2001). Note that, as in most of the empir-
ical literature on macroeconomic forecast evaluation, most of the tests applied assume that the quadratic
loss function is relevant. (The exceptions are the test of “median-unbiasedness” and the test of directional
accuracy.) This choice is mainly dictated by the tractability of this loss function, rather than its key prop-
erties: that larger errors are penalized more than proportionately than smaller ones, and that over- and
underprediction have identical costs. It would be much more difficult to try to identify the most appro-
priate loss function for each setting. If the relevant loss function is not quadratic, then conventional statis-
tical properties of optimal forecasts (e.g., unbiasedness) are not necessarily valid.
18Eviews 3.1 was used for all computations. •W e assess robustness of the main findings by considering various subsamples,
since projection errors may not all be drawn from a single normal distribution.
•W e examine whether patterns of bias or other inefficiency are related to devia-
tions of economic policies from those assumed in the program scenario.
IV. Basic Distributional Properties, and the Question of Bias
Table 1 presents basic, mainly qualitative, information on the distribution of
projection errors for each of five variables studied, for each of the narrow, basic,
and extended samples. (In general, these basic results do not vary across these
samples.) The companion Figure 1, which refers to the basic sample only, offers a
simple view of the errors’ central tendencies, as reflected in median and mean
values, and by the range spanned by the inner two quartiles.
From Table 1 and Figure 1, note the following points:
• Lack of normality. For four of the five variables, there is statistically significant
evidence that the projection errors are not normally distributed. Only for GDP
growth is it not possible to clearly reject normality.19
• Mean and median errors tend to have the same direction. The exception is the
capital account, but for this variable both measures are anyway close to zero.
• Gaps between mean and median errors. In the basic sample (Figure 1), mean
errors exceed median errors, by a factor of two or more, for projections of
GDP, inflation, and the current account. In economic terms, the absolute gap
between mean and median is especially noteworthy in the cases of inflation
and GDP. From the skewness statistics in Table 1, inflation errors are the most
skewed. 
• Statistically significant bias for two of the five variables. For both inflation
and the change in reserves, there is strong evidence that projection errors tend
to be positive; that is, programs have systematically underestimated these vari-
ables. On the other hand, for GDP, and for both current and capital account
balances, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the projections are unbiased.
This same pattern of results applies in all three samples, and to the questions
of both mean- and median-biasedness.20 (The caveat is that the statistical
inferences regarding the mean may not be valid, being based on a t-test that
assumes normality.)
• Errors are often large enough to be of interest. If most errors were in some
sense small, questions of bias and efficiency might not be worth studying,
since removing bias or increasing efficiency could produce little gain in accu-
racy. However, for all five variables, the range spanned by the inner two quar-
tiles, containing just 50 percent of the projection errors, strikes us as being
large enough to be of practical economic interest, and motivates statistical
examination of projections’ accuracy in Section VII. 
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19Only in the largest sample considered can normality of GDP errors be rejected. Excluding from
this sample of 69 programs just one program (an early transition economy case), normality can no longer
be rejected.
20For an explanation of the Wilcoxon signed rank test, used here to test median-unbiasedness, see, for
example, chapter 11 of Hogg and Craig (1995).In closing this section of very basic findings, we suggest caution in their inter-
pretation, for several reasons noted in Section I, but in particular because of the
concern that these cross-country, cross-program data may not be drawn from the
same underlying distribution. This problem cuts two ways. Where bias was not
found, it could be that bias nevertheless exists, but only in a certain minority class
of programs (and is too diluted to be detected in broader samples). On the other
hand, where bias was found, this could be misleading if it reflects only a strong
bias in a particular class of programs. 
Indeed, investigating a little further demonstrates that some of the results (and
nonresults) discussed above are sample dependent. For example, the finding that
inflation projections are biased downward turns out to be primarily a reflection of
bias in a minority class of programs. Samples restricted to cases with high (above
40 percent) inflation in the pre-program year, or in which a steep21 disinflation is
projected, indicate a sizable, and statistically significant, downward bias in infla-
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Table 1. Program Projection Errors: Central Tendencies and Other
Distributional Properties
Reserves Current Capital
GDP Growth Inflation (change) Account Account
Null Hypothesis
and Sample Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign
Median (test if 0)1
Narrow (A) Negative Positive* Positive* Positive Positive
Basic (A+B) Negative Positive** Positive*** Positive Positive
Extended (A+B+C) 0.0 Positive*** Positive*** Positive Positive
Mean (test if 0)2
Narrow (A) Negative Positive* Positive Positive Negative
Basic (A+B) Negative Positive*** Positive** Positive Negative
Extended (A+B+C) Negative Positive*** Positive*** Positive Positive
Skewness (Test of Nonskewness)3
Narrow (A) Negative Positive*** Negative Positive Positive
Basic (A+B) Negative Positive*** Negative Positive Negative
Extended (A+B+C) Negative***4 Positive*** Negative Positive Negative
Test of Normality5
Narrow (A) Rejected*** Rejected** Rejected*** Rejected***
Basic (A+B) Rejected*** Rejected*** Rejected*** Rejected***
Extended (A+B+C) Rejected***4 Rejected*** Rejected*** Rejected*** Rejected***
***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Subsample definitions: “A” refers to 35 non-transition economy programs, approved 1993-97; “B” refers to 19 transition
economy programs, approved 1995–1997; and “C” refers to 15 “early” transition economy programs, approved 1993–94.
1Based on the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test statistic (see Conover, 1980).
2Based on Student's t-test statistic of the significance of the intercept term in a regression of deviations on a constant.
3Based on the Kiefer-Salmon test statistic, as discussed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).
4This result is not general; if one of the 69 observations in this sample is removed, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
5Based on the Jarque-Bera test statistic.
21We consider a steep disinflation to be one in which the projected rate of inflation (expressed in
percentage terms) is less than two-thirds of the previous year’s inflation rate.Alberto Musso and Steven Phillips
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Figure 1. Central Tendencies of Program Projection Errors
(Sample A+B, 54 programs)tion projections. In samples excluding such programs, deviations from projections
are in the same direction, but their mean and median values are much smaller and
are not statistically significant. 
The opposite situation is encountered in the case of growth projections, for
example. Notwithstanding the failure here to find statistically significant evidence
of bias in growth projections, a significant upward bias can be found in subsamples
constructed to capture programs that are in some sense unusually large. (The
concept of a “big program” and the associated results are presented in Section VII.) 
V. The Question of Efficiency
We submit the full sample of program projections to two standard statistical tests
of efficiency.
The first test is based on a relatively weak criterion of efficiency, making use
of a very limited information set. For each of the five variables studied, we regress
the level of the program outcome only on a constant term and the level of the
program projection. In this test, efficiency is associated with a zero intercept and
a slope of one (Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969)). In general, the null hypothesis of
(weak) efficiency cannot be rejected, not even at the 10 percent level. The single
exception involves projections of reserves, for which efficiency can be strongly
rejected, at the 1 percent level.
The second test refers to a stronger criterion of efficiency, in which projection
errors are uncorrelated with any kind of information available when the projec-
tions are made. For each of the five variables studied, we first regress projection
errors on an intercept term and a set of 17 candidate regressors. From the results
of this general specification, the candidate regressor that is least statistically
significant is identified; the regression is then run again excluding this regressor.
The process continues until all remaining candidate regressors—if any—are statis-
tically significant at the 5 percent level. (Since, in several regressions, White’s test
indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity, we choose to judge statistical signif-
icance on the basis of White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.22)
The potential list of such candidate regressors is vast, since it could include
any information known in year (t–1). The set of 17 considered here includes such
usual suspects as the lagged values of the variables being projected, as well as the
values of the projections themselves.23 In addition, we include dummy variables
for certain qualitative types of programs, such as the “early transition economy”
cases, those supported by EFFs rather than SBAs, those in low-income countries
eligible for ESAF loans, and those that follow on earlier programs, and a measure
of the forecast horizon length. We also include a set of four regressors which may
capture, or be correlated with, factors relevant to the large projection errors made
COMPARING PROJECTIONS AND OUTCOMES OF IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS
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22That is, without first testing for heteroskedasticity at each stage, we apply White’s standard errors.
Note that no one test can detect all forms of heteroskedasticity, and it would be tedious to carry out several
of these tests for each specification in the general-to-specific procedure.
23For gross reserves, both the lagged values and the projected ones refer to levels, the former because
of the several missing values for this variable for the (t–2) year (where t is the year of the projection), the
latter in order to avoid the problem of perfect multicollinearity. in the 1997 programs in East Asia: larger access to IMF resources (measured both
absolutely and relative to the size of the economy); larger private external debt,
and a dummy for programs in countries considered to be emerging markets. While
other types of pre-projection information could have been considered, it turns out
that this limited set is sufficient to generate statistically significant findings on the
question of efficiency. 
Following the general-to-specific procedure described above, results for the
final regression specification are reported in Table 2. This time, the general finding
is that efficiency of program projections can be rejected, with the exception of
growth projections. For the other four variables studied, at least one regressor is
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. Thus, with hindsight, it
appears that projections for the current account and the capital account could have
been made more accurate by taking into consideration the pre-program level of
reserves; projections for the change in gross reserves could have been based also
on information on the SDR amount of announced access to IMF resources; and
CPI projections could have been more accurate using information on whether the
program was a followup and on the level of external private debt. Of course, one
should not overinterpret the meaning of these particular results—possibly, the
variables found significant here could be correlated with other, missing variables
that might be much more informative. Even so, the information here could, in prin-
ciple, be used to increase the accuracy of future program projections.
One indication of potential gain in accuracy comes from the R-squared values
shown in Table 2; these suggest, for example, that current account and reserves
projections might be made substantially more accurate using readily available pre-
program information, whereas the scope for increasing accuracy of CPI and capital
account projections in this manner appears relatively smaller. (Of course, greater
apparent potential for improvement might have followed from a more ambitious
specification search, considering additional regressors or nonlinear treatments.) 
VI. Controlling for Policy Outcomes
As discussed in Section I, one reason outcomes might differ from program projec-
tions is that economic policies may turn out not to be conducted in the manner
assumed when the projections were formulated. Here we examine, in a prelimi-
nary and indirect manner, the role of such “policy deviations” in the main findings
regarding bias and efficiency.
To try to control for policy deviations, we construct two kinds of summary indi-
cators. One approach considers the amount of IMF financing received—over the
entire life24 of a program—as a share of the amount anticipated at the program’s
outset; we also construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 whenever this
“percent drawn” is less than 50 percent.25 The second approach is similar to that
Alberto Musso and Steven Phillips
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24One flaw in this measure is that the projections we analyze often refer to a time horizon that is
shorter than the life of the program. 
25We thank Miguel Savastano for providing the data (used in Mussa and Savastano, 1999) we used to
construct these variables. used in Mecagni (1999), defining an “interrupted program” as one in which the
IMF’s Executive Board does not act to complete26 the first scheduled formal review
of the program within three months after the date originally scheduled. While
neither approach directly measures specific deviations from program policies, it is
reasonable to suppose that IMF decisions of whether or not to disburse fully, or to
complete a (satisfactory) program review on time, would be related with the degree
of adherence to program policy assumptions.
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Table 2. Program Projection Errors: OLS Regressions 
Extended Sample, 69 programs
(with dummy for early transition programs)
GDP Reserves Current Capital
Growth Inflation (change) Account Account
Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob.
Intercept –1.07 0.100* 2.17 0.000*** 1.42 0.004** 1.31 0.014** –0.86 0.095*
Early transition (dummy)
Log access to IMF resources, SDRs –0.20 0.039**
Access / GDP (PPP, t–1), percent




Follow-up program dummy –0.71 0.036**
H  (horizon length, months)
GDP t–1
log (1+(infl. t–1)/100)
Level of RES t–1 –0.41 0.012** 0.39 0.015**
CA t–1
GDP t (proj.)
log (1+(proj. infl. t)/100)
Level of RES t (proj.)
CA t (proj.)
Diagnostics:
R-squared 0.000 0.091 0.111 0.107 0.088
Adjusted R-squared 0.000 0.064 0.098 0.093 0.074
F-statistic (all coefficients=0) 3.319 0.042** 8.407 0.005*** 8.002 0.006*** 6.453 0.013**
***significant at 1 percent level.
**significant at 5 percent level.
*significant at 10 percent level.
Cutoff for inclusion of regressors is significance at the 5 percent level.
26In IMF operational usage, “completion” of a formal program review signals relative satisfaction
(since reviews which are initiated but turn out to yield insufficiently satisfactory overall assessments are
simply not “completed”).Possibly, programs that are interrupted or have a low percent drawn might be
more likely than others to have been hit by some form of bad luck, which may also
be reflected in the pattern of projection errors. Negative exogenous shocks might
make compliance with originally-agreed policies difficult; if agreement on a modi-
fied set of policies cannot be reached, the program could be interrupted. However,
the possibility of this interpretation does not undermine the analysis below.
Whether interrupted programs reflect mainly bad faith or bad luck, the effect of
removing the influence of these programs from the full sample results should be
in the same direction. As it happens, we find little sign of such an effect, so the
question is moot.
We first reexamine the statistically significant results of Section IV concerning
the question of bias. Recall that projections for both inflation and changes in offi-
cial reserves showed statistically significant bias. Table 3 shows the results of
adding, to the simple regressions of projection errors on a constant term, several
combinations of regressors based on the indicators discussed above (for the basic
sample of 54 programs).
For inflation projection errors, it is interesting to see that the dummy for inter-
rupted programs is statistically significant, with the positive sign one might have
expected.27 The other additional regressors are not significant. The question here,
however, is not whether policy deviations influence program outcomes for infla-
tion, but whether the statistical bias in inflation projections reported earlier is
mainly driven by such policy deviations. The evidence does not support this
suggestion: note from the first two columns of Table 3 that the positive estimate of
the intercept is diminished only slightly by the addition of the significant policy
regressor, and that its statistical significance is maintained.
As regards errors in projections of changes in reserves, the additional, policy-
related regressors are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, although
the dummy for low percent drawn just misses being significant (and has the nega-
tive sign one would expect). This time, adding these variables can diminish the
statistical significance of the estimated intercept, though the direction of move-
ment in that estimate itself is unclear. Of course, the policy deviations question is
somewhat peculiar for the case of reserves projections, since the IMF’s own policy
disbursement decisions can directly affect outcomes, and therefore projection
errors, for reserves. But perhaps the key point is to recall that the bias found for
reserves projections was in the direction of underprojection—whereas if the
formation of program projections ignored the fact that in a certain percentage of
programs policies would go off-track, then the resulting pattern of bias would have
been expected to be in the opposite direction.
It is also interesting to reconsider the findings regarding efficiency presented
earlier in Table 2. Recall that program projections for four of the five variables
studied were found to be correlated, statistically significantly, with variables
reflecting pre-program information. Possibly, some of the variables that turned out
significant in Table 2 did so only because they were somehow predictive of how
Alberto Musso and Steven Phillips
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27That is, if interrupted programs are more likely than others to be characterized by looser-than-
programmed monetary and fiscal policies.policies would later be implemented during the program. But this does not appear
to be the case. Adding to the regression specifications shown in Table 2 the dummy
for interrupted programs, or the regressor measuring the percentage drawn, yields
little change: the regressors previously found to be significant are still significant
at the 5 percent level.
These findings are not claimed to be definitive, and in particular it might be
useful to reexamine the question using direct measures of policy performance.
Bearing in mind that the indirect policy proxies used here have limitations, the
message of this section is merely our failure to find signs that policy deviations
play a dominant role in the patterns of statistical bias and inefficiency found in
Sections IV and V.28
VII. Projection Errors in “Big Programs”
In this section, we investigate whether the basic results for central tendencies of
projection errors (see Section V) are sample-dependent; in particular, whether
these results continue to apply after the data are split into subsamples according to
our notion of a “big program.” The exercise has two objectives. One is to illustrate
concretely the need to interpret the results of Section V with caution—since
program projections are not generated by applying a single model to a single
economic structure, summary generalizations based on full sample results may not
be the most informative. 
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Table 3. Inflation and Reserves Deviations:  Effect of Controlling 
for Policy Performance (Basic Sample 54 Programs)
Dummy
Interruption Percent 
Intercept Dummy Drawn 0–50% Percent Drawn
Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob.
Inflation
Intercept Only 1.393 0.000
Interruption Dummy 1.218 0.000 0.675 0.043
Drawn 0–50 % Dummy 1.391 0.000 0.003 0.992
Percent Drawn 1.636 0.000 0.004 0.542
All 1.393 0.016 0.655 0.058 0.056 0.872 0.002 0.739
Change in Reserves
Intercept Only 0.321 0.029
Interruption Dummy 0.314 0.067 0.027 0.936
Drawn 0–50 % Dummy 0.523 0.004 –0.573 0.055
Percent Drawn –0.070 0.866 0.006 0.314
All 0.436 0.43 0.04 0.904 –0.549 0.111 0.001 0.879
28This of course does not mean that policy deviations do not influence program outcomes, a separate
question. The second purpose is simply to provide a closer look at the track record of
program projections in a class of programs which, although a minority, may be the
best known: what we call “big programs.” Thus we seek to capture programs we
suspect may be qualitatively different from others by defining subsamples
according to whether the economy in question: (i) is atypically large in terms of
its GDP; (ii) is approved to receive IMF financial resources during the program on
an unusually large scale, either in terms of SDRs or relative to its economic size;
(iii) has developed to the point of being considered an emerging market; and (iv)
relatedly, has indebtedness to foreign private creditors that is atypically high. Our
informal impression is that these characteristics tend to be found together, and that
in these cases IMF-supported programs are conceived at their outset mainly as a
response to a crisis driven by capital outflows more than anything else,29 possibly
with a view to avoiding systemic effects. 
To  investigate the properties of “big” programs’ projection errors, we first
construct variables to measure, for all programs, the characteristics listed above.
Examination of these variables’ distributions confirmed that most are skewed
toward their high end. We therefore chose threshold levels for each of these vari-
ables, arbitrary round numbers which would isolate all positive outliers and a good
part of the distribution’s right tail (say, the top 20 or 30 percent of the distribution).
Details of these variables and the thresholds chosen are found in Table 4, which
presents mean and median statistics for subsamples defined by each of these
thresholds, for each of the five types of projections we study.
In general, the pattern of results from these subsamples suggests interesting
differences in central tendencies of projection errors between “big” programs and
the more typical ones. Often, in using Table 4 to compare central tendencies of
samples above and below these thresholds, the statistical significance or even the
sign of the statistics changes:
• Growth.  While no significant evidence of bias was encountered in the full
sample, there is considerable evidence that growth projections are biased upward
in the various big program subsamples—unlike in the complementary subsam-
ples consisting of what might be called “typical” programs. 
• Inflation. The significant downward bias found in the full sample is not driven by
the experience of big programs; on the contrary, evidence of such bias if anything
tends to be stronger in the subsamples of more typical programs.30
• Reserves. Again, the significant downward bias in the full sample is not driven
by the big programs; indeed, the bias appears to come entirely from the typical
programs. 
• Current Account. For these projections, no bias is detected in the full samples.
Nevertheless, splitting the sample reveals substantial differences: projection
errors in the big programs show means and medians that tend to be positive and
Alberto Musso and Steven Phillips
40
29For example, as opposed to being prompted by a terms of trade shock or a realization that the
external current account and/or fiscal deficit will need to be adjusted, sooner or later, to reach sustain-
able paths. 
30But recall from Section V that the full sample findings of downward bias in inflation projections are
not robust to excluding other minority classes of programs.COMPARING PROJECTIONS AND OUTCOMES OF IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS
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Table 4. Central Tendencies in “Big” and “Typical” Programs 
(Subsamples of Basic Sample)
Projected Variable and Sample Observations Mean Prob. Median Prob.
1. Growth
Full sample (“Basic”) 54 –0.75 0.201 –0.08 0.311
High access – I (>SDR 400 m.) 15 –2.59 0.023** –3.00 0.036**
All other programs 37 –0.04 0.955 1.02 0.755
High access – II (>1 % of GDP) 19 –2.42 0.052* –2.20 0.061*
All other programs 35 0.16 0.788 0.10 0.798
High GDP (>US$ 100 b.) 18 –2.49 0.011** –2.50 0.017**
All other programs 36 –1.38 0.039** –0.20 0.109
Emerging markets 15 –2.23 0.047** –3.00 0.065*
All other programs 39 –0.18 0.794 0.10 0.994
High private debt (>10 % GDP) 12 –1.93 0.088* –1.07 0.170
All other programs 42 –0.41 0.549 –0.03 0.678
2. Inflation  (outcome/projection)
Full sample (“Basic”) 54 1.39 0.010*** 1.10 0.021**
High access – I (>SDR 400 m.) 15 1.38 0.000*** 0.95 0.000***
All other programs 37 1.39 0.000*** 1.11 0.000***
High access – II (>1 % of GDP) 19 1.64 0.000*** 1.34 0.000***
All other programs 35 1.26 0.000*** 1.04 0.000***
High GDP (>US$ 100 b.) 18 1.39 0.098* 1.05 0.200
All other programs 36 1.31 0.000*** 1.06 0.000***
Emerging markets 15 1.40 0.164 1.06 0.377
All other programs 39 1.39 0.033** 1.11 0.037**
High private debt (>10 % GDP) 12 1.29 0.000*** 1.22 0.004***
All other programs 42 1.42 0.000*** 1.08 0.000***
3. Reserves
Full sample (“Basic”) 54 0.32 0.029** 0.30 0.010***
High access – I (>SDR 400 m.) 15 –0.12 0.674 0.05 0.865
All other programs 37 0.49 0.004*** 0.39 0.005***
High access – II (>1 % of GDP) 19 0.25 0.480 0.28 0.494
All other programs 35 0.36 0.007*** 0.32 0.003***
High GDP (>US$ 100 b.) 18 –0.07 0.786 0.06 0.586
All other programs 36 0.08 0.634 0.08 0.407
Emerging markets 15 –0.15 0.619 0.08 0.820
All other programs 39 0.50 0.003*** 0.39 0.004***
High private debt (>10 % GDP) 12 –0.02 0.965 0.07 0.666
All other programs 42 0.42 0.007*** 0.33 0.007***much larger than those of typical programs, though only some of these results are
statistically significant.
• Capital Account. In this case, there is no sign of bias in the full sample, and
neither are any of the mean and median values significantly different from zero
in either the big or typical program subsamples. Still, it is interesting to note that
projection errors’ central tendencies in these subsamples tend to go in opposite
directions, with the capital account balance tending to fall short of its projected
value in the big programs. 
In short, our informal concept of a minority class of “big” programs, though
roughly defined, often appears to be relevant in analyzing the track record of
program projections. 
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Table 4. (concluded)
Projected Variable and Sample Observations Mean Prob. Median Prob.
4. Current Account
Full sample (“Basic”) 54 0.34 0.412 0.13 0.366
High access – I (>SDR 400 m.) 15 0.85 0.103 0.43 0.041**
All other programs 37 0.14 0.793 –0.19 0.978
High access – II (>1 % of GDP) 19 0.84 0.401 0.37 0.324
All other programs 35 0.06 0.855 –0.01 0.756
High GDP (>US$ 100 b.) 18 0.72 0.096* 0.40 0.041**
All other programs 36 –0.11 0.783 0.01 0.526
Emerging markets 15 0.78 0.138 0.43 0.132
All other programs 39 0.17 0.575 –0.12 0.878
High private debt (>10 % GDP) 12 –0.59 0.634 0.30 0.969
All other programs 42 0.60 0.141 0.00 0.291
5. Capital account
Full sample (“Basic”) 54 –0.02 0.969 0.15 0.598
High access – I (>SDR 400 m.) 15 –0.97 0.201 –0.27 0.182
All other programs 37 0.35 0.517 0.33 0.237
High access – II (>1 % of GDP) 19 –0.60 0.580 –0.53 0.507
All other programs 35 0.30 0.413 0.33 0.185
High GDP (>US$ 100 b.) 18 –0.78 0.213 –0.17 0.276
All other programs 36 0.19 0.698 0.09 0.706
Emerging markets 15 –0.93 0.222 –0.27 0.244
All other programs 39 0.33 0.536 0.25 0.267
High private debt (>10 % GDP) 12 0.57 0.706 0.12 0.610
All other programs 42 –0.18 0.634 0.15 0.776
Notes: ***significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level; *significant at 10 percent level.It is interesting to recall here the experience of the 1997 programs in East
Asia: as noted earlier, these received wide attention for the deviations that materi-
alized from programs’original projections for output growth as well as the current
and capital accounts of the balance of payments. Were these deviations in some
sense typical? Compared against the full sample, where no significant bias was
found for these types of projections, the answer is no. However, considering only
the minority class of “big” programs, there is some evidence of a pattern in which
growth turns out lower, the current account balance turns out stronger, and the
capital account weaker turns out weaker, than projected. Some but not all of this
evidence is statistically significant.
VIII. The Question of Accuracy
The results of the efficiency tests in Section V suggest that program projections for
four out of the five variables could have been made more accurate by taking into
account available pre-program information. However, those findings say little
about the accuracy of program projections (only that accuracy could have been
improved). 
In this section, we examine the question of accuracy in two ways. First, we
consider whether program projections have any predictive value beyond that of a
naïve “no change” forecast (that is, forecasts made with the random walk model),
using Theil’s U statistic. Second, we also perform tests of projections’directional
accuracy. (In considering both sets of results, recall from Section III that program
projections in principle have the “advantage” of being informed by developments
already observed within the projection period.) 
Comparison to a Random Walk Forecast
Theil’s U statistic represents a comparison of the size of the projection errors that
result from two different forecasting methods. Here, the comparison is between
the errors in the projections made in IMF-supported programs with the errors that
would have resulted if projections for the first program year (t) instead had been
set to simply equal the (t–1) value. For each set of errors, the root mean squared
error (RMSE) is computed; Theil’s U statistic is simply the ratio of the RMSE of
the actual projection errors to the RMSE of the alternative forecasts. The lower the
value of U, the greater the relative accuracy of the IMF set of projections. If the U
statistic is equal or close to one, the two forecasting methods perform similarly (in
terms of RMSE). If it is lower (higher) than one, then the IMF forecasts are better
(worse) than the random walk ones.31
Table 5 shows the Theil’s U results for all five projection variables studied,
for various sample definitions (in the top panel) and forecast horizons32 (lower
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31A forecast based on a random walk is often called “naïve,” since it utilizes only the information
summarized in the t–1 value. Still, it is a natural benchmark to consider first, and certain other types of
economic forecasts have struggled to outperform it. 
32Recall that the forecast horizon H is measured as the number of months between the date of the
approval of the program and the first month of the year to which the projection refers. panel); it also includes a set of corresponding modified Diebold-Mariano statis-
tics (in the middle panel). This statistic is based on Harvey, Leybourne, and
Newbold (1997), who modified the statistic proposed by Diebold and Mariano
(1995) in order to test the null hypothesis of no statistically significant differ-
ence between two sets of forecasts when the sample is relatively small. Note
that results for these tests should be interpreted with some caution because, as
recognized by the authors of these statistics, the tests tend to be somewhat over-
sized, particularly for small samples. For this reason, we report the statistics
only for the larger samples. 
The results are split strongly, depending on which variable is being projected:
• On the negative side, the last two columns of Table 5 suggest that program
projections for both the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments
had very little predictive power beyond that of the random walk alternative.
Regardless of the sample definition considered in Table 5, the Theil’s U values
for these two types of projections are close to unity. None of the DM statistics are
close to being statistically significant. 
•H owever, the first three columns of Table 5 show that for growth, inflation,
and reserves, the program projections in general had considerably smaller
errors than did the benchmark alternative. (The exceptions are in the “early
transition” subsample.) For the growth and reserves projections, the evidence
in favor of the program projections is statistically significant. The DM statis-
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Table 5. Theil’s U and Modified Diebold-Mariano Statistics
Number of GDP Current Capital 
Sample Observations Growth Inflation Reserves Account Account
Theil’s U statistics
Basic sample (A+B) 54 (51) 0.44 0.10 0.49 0.98 0.93
Extended sample (A+B+C) 69 (65) 0.58 0.15 0.52 0.96 0.89
Of which:
A.  Non-transition 35 (34) 0.47 0.09 0.51 0.96 0.94
B.  Transition, 1995–97 19 (17) 0.43 0.68 0.44 1.06 0.85
C.  Transition, 1993–94 15 (14) 1.10 3.78 0.64 0.87 0.83
Modified Diebold-Mariano statistics
Basic sample (A+B) 54 (51) –2.62** –1.50 –1.77 –0.40 –0.31
Extended sample (A+B+C) 69 (65) –2.31** –1.48 –2.00** –0.75 –0.78
Theil’s U statistics
Within Extended Sample:
H ≤ 6 19 (17) 0.32 0.74 0.31 1.57 0.45
6 < H < 12 34 (32) 0.65 0.11 0.55 1.01 1.05
H ≥ 12 16 (16)  0.80 2.66 0.94 0.91 1.09
Notes: The smaller numbers of observations shown in parentheses refer to results for Reserves and Capital Account,
due to some missing lagged values. The modified D-M statistics are based on Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold (1997).
They are compared with the critical values from the t distribution. In particular, two asterisks (**) means that the null
hypothesis of no statistically significant difference between the two sets  of forecasts can be rejected at the 5 percent level.
“H” refers to length of forecast horizon in months, as discussed in Section III.tics are not significant for the inflation projections, despite their very low
Theil’s U value.33
For the three variables for which the Theil’s U results indicate that the
program projections tend to have smaller errors than the random walk alternative,
it is interesting to consider the role of horizon length in this finding. Dividing up
the extended sample, we find that for two of these variables—growth and
reserves—the value of U is higher in the subsamples with longer horizons. This
pattern is consistent with some part of the program projections’ relative success
deriving from being informed by events observed within the projection period.
Note that no such pattern is found for the inflation projections. 
Directional Accuracy
The previous test of accuracy presumes that the conventional “squared errors”
loss function is relevant; here, we conduct a test which avoids this presumption.
The analysis of directional accuracy asks whether or not the variable being
projected actually moved in the same direction, relative to its (provisional)
value in year t–1, as the movement implied by the program projection.
Although the size of the errors is not considered under this test, it may be of
interest to know whether a target variable such as inflation, for example, at least
moves in the intended direction. 
For each variable studied, the number of each of the four possible pairings
of projection and outcome directions of change is tallied; this information is
then used to construct a test of the null hypothesis of independence (lack of a
relationship) between the directions of projected and actual changes. Two alter-
native test statistics are constructed, one for a chi-squared test and the other the
more conservative statistic proposed by Yates (1934).34 Table 6 presents both
statistics for each of the five variables studied, in each of five different sample
definitions.
For all but one variable, the results tend to support the directional accuracy of
program projections. For GDP growth, inflation, the current account, and the
change in reserves, the null hypothesis of independence can be rejected at the 1
percent level, using either test, in both the full sample of 69 programs and the basic
sample of 54 programs. (Only in the smaller subsamples are the results not always
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.)
On the other hand, for projections of net capital inflows, there is no significant
evidence—in any of the samples considered, for either test statistic—that the
direction of actual changes is related to program projections at the 5 percent
significance level.
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33We suspect that this pattern reflects considerable variation in the differences between the two infla-
tion projections’ errors, combined with a few cases in which the program projections beat the random
walk alternative by very large margins. 
34See Conover (1980). Yates’statistic differs by including a correction intended to compensate for the
fact that the continuous chi-square distribution function is used to approximate the discrete distribution
function of the test statistic. Since some have argued that this correction is overly conservative, we


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this paper we analyzed the statistical relationship between IMF program projec-
tions and observed outcomes. We emphasize that this is a limited question, and in
particular that statistical analysis of such projections’ track record does not itself
constitute an evaluation of IMF-supported programs—it does not address such
questions as the appropriateness of the design and objectives of these programs, or
whether IMF involvement substantially influences economic policies and
outcomes. 
However, we believe that analysis of the kind provided here can be part of the
review of programs’historical experience, and that it may yield insights, or direc-
tions for research, that are relevant to overall reviews of IMF-supported programs.
If program projections are worth the effort of formulating, and announcing
publicly, then the statistical relationship between these projections and actual
outcomes is a natural question. We recognize that there exist some potentially
important problems of interpretation in applying standard “forecast evaluation”
techniques to IMF program projections; these problems should motivate caution
in interpretation now, and more in-depth research in the future. 
Some readers may have jumped to this concluding section, looking only for
a simple bottom line: are IMF program projections good or bad? Having missed
Section II, these readers should be reminded that there is no simple, single
criterion of a good forecast. This paper has analyzed program projections along
three dimensions: bias, efficiency, and accuracy. For three types of projections
studied—output growth, and the current and capital accounts of the balance of
payments—no statistically significant evidence of bias was found in the main
sample considered. However, for both inflation and official reserves, the
projections were systematically below outcomes (a finding that confirms the
conclusions of previous studies that used a less rigorous approach). Whether
there are good reasons for such patterns to exist is a question this study cannot
answer. It should also be recalled that some of these results on the question of
bias were found to depend on the sample considered—for example, central
tendencies in what we call “big” programs were often different from those of
more typical programs.
As regards the question of efficiency, the findings depended on the standard
considered. In general, the program projections did well against the most basic
efficiency criterion. With a stricter criterion, efficiency of the program projections
for output growth still could not be rejected. However, for the other four variables
studied, statistically significant evidence was found indicating that program
projections did not take all available information into account, suggesting that
these projections could have been made more accurate (by conventional criteria).
Nevertheless, the program projections for several variables were accurate enough
to outperform the usual benchmark, a forecast based on a random walk, moreover,
for all but one variable, the program projections tended to correctly predict the
direction of change. In terms of accuracy, the projections for the current and
capital accounts of the balance of payments are the ones that seem to have the
most room for improvement, especially in “big” programs. 
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